Washington In its final report released Tuesday, the House task force that looked into the assassination attempts against Donald Trump makes dozens of recommendations, such as the Secret Service recording all radio communications and reducing protection for foreign leaders so that the president and other high-ranking U.S. officials are protected.
With regard to the July 13 assassination attempt in Butler, Pennsylvania, where a gunman’s bullet grazed Trump’s ear at a campaign rally, the 180-page report has 25 suggestions. Eleven broad suggestions for the Secret Service are also included.
The terrible and startling events in Butler, Pennsylvania, were avoidable and shouldn’t have occurred, according to the Task Force’s findings. However, the 13-member committee stated that Thomas Matthew Crooks was not able to almost kill the former president because of a single action or choice. The former president and everyone present at the campaign event were put in grave danger as a result of a combination of preexisting conditions that compromised the effectiveness of the human and material resources deployed on July 13, 2024, as well as numerous planning, execution, and leadership failures that occurred on and before that date.
Under the leadership of Rep. Jason Crow, D-Colo., and Chairman Mike Kelly, R-Pa., the task force commended the Secret Service for stopping a second attack on Trump in Florida later that year: On the other hand, what happened in West Palm Beach, Florida on September 15, 2024, showed how well-executed security systems can prevent an assassination attempt.
The bipartisan panel recommended, among other things, that the Secret Service should record all radio communications, something that did not occur in Butler on July 13. According to the study, the lack of radio records or recordings severely restricts the capacity to reconstruct events for the purposes of investigation or evaluation.
In order to concentrate on the USSS’s main responsibility, which is to protect the President and other important U.S. leaders, the panel also suggested that Congress, the Homeland Security Department, and the U.S. Secret Service examine the protective role the USSS plays for foreign leaders and determine whether such responsibilities can be transferred or eliminated.
The task force also recommended that the Secret Service look into hiring more people or offering flexible positions during times of high pressure so that it can adjust to changing circumstances, give non-Secret Service employees who are helping it on-site more thorough training, and create and codify a procedure for handling Secret Service disputes with protectees’ staffs.
Regardless of political party or protectee, the report notes that during our inquiry, a number of Secret Service personnel voiced their dissatisfaction with bargaining with staff.
In addition to interviewing dozens of witnesses and gaining access to 18,000 documents, the task force stated that the FBI only gave it access to 81 of the more than 1,000 summaries of witness interviews.
Several decision points that, if handled differently, may have stopped gunman Thomas Crooks from firing eight shots at the Butler rally were highlighted by the task team, according to the report.
According to the task force, Crooks was able to elude law enforcement, climb on the top of the American Glass Research (AGR) building complex, and open fire because a high-risk region adjacent to the rally venue was not secured.
According to the task force, the Secret Service also failed to provide state and local partners with clear instructions regarding which organization was in charge of securing the area. Concerns about a lack of manpower were raised but not properly addressed, the group said, and local sniper teams stationed on the AGR property believed they were responsible for watching the rally venue and the crowd, not the area outside the secured perimeter.
The failures that led to the tragic events of July 13 were not entirely isolated to the campaign event itself, or the days preceding it. The task committee stated that the particular failures mentioned above could have happened because of preexisting problems with training and leadership.
Secret Service personnel with little to no experience in advance planning roles were given significant responsibility, despite the July 13 event being held at a higher-risk outdoor venue with many line of sight issues, in addition to specific intelligence about a long-range threat, it said.
Further, some of the Secret Service agents in significant advance planning roles did not clearly understand the delineation of their responsibilities.
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